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CIVIL LIBERTIES

A Civil Liberties Analysis of
Surrogacy Arrangements
Larry Gostin

Proponents of surrogacy arrangements' assert that a
married couple's right to "procreative autonomy" includes the right to contract with consenting collaborators for the purposes of bearing a child. The right to
"genetic continuity" and to rear offspring are all part of
the right of reproductive choice for the contracting father and his partner.'
Critics of surrogacy arrangements similarly cite "reproductive autonomy" as the basis for their claim that
women cannot be compelled by contract to use their
bodies in particular ways--either to forgo the right to
abortion or to be "fetal containers." The right to autonomy over her own body and to rear the offspring she has
borne are all part of the mother's reproductive
freedom. 3
Both proponents and critics of-surrogacy arrangements, therefore, claim that their positions maximize
freedom and liberty. Each position, of course, focuses
on the autonomy of the party the commentator favors;
the analysis is invariably outcome-determinative, without enunciating a neutral civil liberties framework. Neither proponents nor critics define clearly what the "right
to procreate" entails, or what resolution is warranted
when there is a conflict. What is absent from the debate,
and what I wish to offer, is a civil liberties analysis of
surrogacy arrangements.
In this essay I come to the following conclusions
based upon a civil liberties analysis. First, surrogacy arrangements cannot be prohibited or criminalized. Second, the state cannot ban the exchange of money for
surrogacy services, provided the money is paid for conception, gestation, and birth. Money, however, cannot
be paid on condition that the gestational mother waive
her parental rights over the child. Third, contractual
provisions that require the gestational mother to waive
her parental rights or her rights to privacy and autonomy are void and unenforceable. Fourth, when the child

is born, both the gestational mother and the genetic
father are the legal parents. If the gestational mother
declines to relinquish her parental rights and a custody
battle ensues, custody of the child should be determined
under a "best interests" standard.
Non-specific performance of the surrogacy agreement is not an elegant result from the perspective of
contract law. It also creates risks for those who enter
into surrogacy arrangements. It does not foreclose the
practice of surrogacy, but would encourage those considering this path to think carefully before planning to
bring a child into the world using this method of reproduction. There would be no guarantee that the gestational mother would, after birth, waive her parental
rights. If she refused to do so, however, the genetic father and she would find themselves in no worse position
than that of any two parents involved in a custody dispute.
I want to enunciate the positions taken in this essay
very clearly because they are, to some extent, contrary
to the elegant decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in the Baby M case. 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court
treated that surrogacy arrangement as a simple custody
matter, as I do. However, the court went further by
banning, if not criminalizing, commercial surrogacy.
Where Reproductive Freedoms Coinddc
The parties in a surrogacy arrangement have substantial
civil liberties interests: the rights to privacy in making an
intimate personal decision about reproduction; the right
to autonomy in decisions affecting the health and welfare of the mother and the offspring; and the right to
association with future offspring. In this section I will
demonstrate the human and constitutional interests at
stake in surrogacy arrangements. I will argue that if a
private consensual arrangement promotes happiness
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and contentment for both parties, and involves the exercise of constitutional rights to privacy and autonomy,
then the state should not interfere with these arrangements in the absence of a clearly demonstrated harm to
the child. This civil liberties analysis balances the strong
reproductive rights that the gestational mother and genetic father have individually and collectively, on the
one hand, with the government's speculative interests in
protecting the unborn child1 on the other. I conclude
that the state has no sufficient ground for banning or
criminalizing surrogacy arrangements.
What interests do constitutional rights to privacy
place beyond the reach of government? The Constitution's promise of privacy and autonomy enfolds a constellation of intimate sexual, social, and family relationships, including bodily integrity, personal choice, and
future association with offspring. Privacy is a "sensitive,
key relationship of human existence, central to family
life, community welfare and the development of human
personality." 5
The U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated a fundamental right "whether to bear or beget a child." 6 Citizens have a privacy right to decide whether, how, and
when to bear a child. Griswold,7 Loving,8 and
ZablockP defined that right within the marital relationship. The Court in Griswold regarded marriage as "an
association ... a harmony of living ... a bilateral loyalty, not a commercial or social project." In Eisenstadt'*
and Carey" the Court extended Griswold to nonmarried couples, using unequivocal language in its defense of interpersonal relationships. Contraception, it
stated, concerns "the most intimate of human activities
and relationships"' 2 ; a couple is "an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup." ' s
The Constitution's promise of privacy protects not
only human relationships but also the right to decide
whether to conceive and to carry a fetus to term. Roe v.
Wade' 4 concerned the potential detriments to pregnant
women of being made to carry an unwanted fetus to
term--the medical and psychological harm of having to
bear and, possibly, to raise the child, and the distress of
having their own choices about their bodies overriden
by the state. Later, in Akron' 5 and Thornburgb,'6 the
Supreme Court refocused its thinking on abortion, describing it as the woman's private informed choice,
which is for her and her physician alone to make.
The contraception cases decided by the Supreme
Court also concern the right to make choices about future offspring. In Griswold v. Connecticut,' 7 the first
privacy case decided by the Court, the state had imposed
a criminal penalty upon a physician for advising and
prescribing contraception to a married couple, despite
the fact that pregnancy would have jeopardized the
woman's health. The Court overturned the statute, not-

ing that there was a "zone of privacy created by several
constitutional guarantees."' 8 By criminalizing the use of
contraception the government had 19
exerted a "maximum
destructive impact" upon privacy.
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that natural parents have a constitutionally protected interest to rear
their child."0 The "fundamental liberty interest" in the
care, custody, and management of the child extends
even to the unwed father. " A father's interest is constitutionally protected when he "act[s] as a father toward
his children."" It is difficult for any unwed father to
demonstrate his parental attachment to a newborn. But
a father's desire to reproduce and his financial and emotional attention to the welfare of the fetus help create a
meaningful paternal involvement.
Surrogacy arrangements, then, deserve constitutional protection because of the private relationships
and procreative intention of the parties, the woman's
control over her own body, and the rights of genetic
parents to association with their child.
The gestational mother has a particularly strong
right of privacy and autonomy, founded upon several
factors: her experience of artificial insemination, the
changes in her body, her emotional commitment, her
nurturing of the fetus for nine months, and the labor
and pain of giving birth. The fact that she did not originally intend to keep the child does not dispose of this
complex constitutional and social issue. Her bonding
and identification with a baby born of her own body is
an understandable and real human experience.
Supporters of surrogacy contracts ask the gestational
mother to alienate herself from the child she is carrying,
to become a dispassionate incubator for the growing
fetus. The gestational mother's claims to control her
own body and to be involved in the parenting of her
child cannot be so easily trivialized. Her physical and
psychological burdens deserve respect beyond the artificial confines of a sterile contract.
The genetic father and his partner use the surrogacy
arrangement for the purpose of having a child, implementing their personal decision to procreate and to obtain the right to intimate association with the future
offspring. The genetic father has a deep desire to reproduce and to care (usually tenderly) for a child. It is the
father's intention to procreate that begins the process of
reproduction; without his desire to reproduce, there
would be no conception and birth. He has demonstrated
by his personal decision to enter into the arrangement
that he haspaternal feelings and desires similar to those
of a father in a conventional relationship. His psychological commitment and human desire to raise and care
for a child entities him to be treated as a parent and to
assert a privacy right consistent with that status.
It is true that the donation of sperm does not involve
the intensely private sexual and social relationship of
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conventional reproduction. Nor does a man have an
unqualified right to use his power in the marketplace to
inseminate a stranger for a fee. The principle enunciated
in Griswold, that privacy protects an intimate sexual
and social relationship but not a commercial project, is
apt to demonstrate that the genetic father's privacy
rights are not without limit.
Critics would either ban or criminalize surrogacy because of the greater stake the gestational mother brings
to the arrangement.' 3 This weighing of human interests
in favor of the gestational mother may have meaning
where there is a discernible conflict of interests. But the
logic of those who would ban surrogacy falters considerably when the interests of both contracting parties
coincide--as they usually do.. In such cases the gestational mother's constitutional interests militate against
staie restrictions on surrogacy, not in favor of them.
Balanced against the powerful individual and collective interests in surrogacy arrangements are the undocumented and speculative interests of the state. Some persuasively argue that the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the child. 4 But surrogacy arrangements do
not pose any clear harm to children. There is the academic argument that no matter how maltreated or unwanted a child may be, she is better off than never having been born.'5 This is not a powerful argument because the state may well have a legitimate interest in
preventing the birth of babies whom no one will want or
care for. There are, however, no data to demonstrate
that children born as the result of surrogacy contracts
are worse off by any measure-that they suffer more
neglect, abandonment, and physical abuse, or that they
receive less nurturing and love.
The Baby M court acknowledged that the long-term
effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, only
"feared.' 6 The court noted that the child might suffer
from the knowledge that she was born as a result of a
commercial transaction, and that the natural father and
gestational mother might suffer when they "realize the
consequences of their conduct.""27 The fact is that children are often born in adverse circumstances. Children
can thrive when there is only one parent to love them.
The infant born of a surrogacy arrangement is not necessarily disadvantaged, for she has a genetic father, an
adoptive mother, and a gestational mother who may
each come to treasure her. The Baby M court, moreover,
is wrong to suppose that the parents will invariably, or
even frequently, regret their decision. In the majority of
cases the parties see the arrangement as in their own best
interests. The hurt and human sadness evident in the
Baby M case should not be used as a benchmark to
judge all surrogacy arrangements.
Others point to the irreconcilable problems posed
when the surrogate's baby turns out to have a physical
deformity or a genetically inherited disease, or to be

mentally retarded. 8 Men who sign surrogacy agreements, it is suggested, want perfect babies in their own
images, and would be more likely to reject an imperfect
child. It is true that surrogacy arrangements appear to
stack the deck against an imperfect child, since neither
party has any clear stake in the child. The gestational
mother is invited not to think of the baby as her own.
The contracting father has a certain image of how the
child should be. He will be less likely to bond with the
infant if he has not seen it growing in a woman he loves,
seen it being born, or had a relationship with it in the
early days and weeks of its life. While the possibility of
both parents disclaiming responsibility for an imperfect
child is an understandable concern, no data, again, are
available to support it. Many handicapped infants are
abandoned, and it is not at all certain that surrogacy
arrangements would have any significant impact on the
rate of abandonment.
Those who would ban or criminalize surrogacy have
a heavy burden to explain why they would allow the
stare to stifle an activity that fulfills a human need without imposing any tangible harm on others.
Families in our society take many different forms,
and a great deal of latitude in "private ordering" should
be encouraged. Tolerance of diversity among families,
and in the way they are formed, is part of a rich civil
liberties tradition. Society should not be too quick to
judge those who, for whatever reason, use surrogacy as
a method of reproduction.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the Baby M case
found "no offense to our current laws where a woman
voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a 'surrogate' mother, provided that she is not subject to a
binding agreement to surrender her child. '" However,
it found that the constitutional right to procreate does
not extend as far as claimed by the parties to a surrogacy
arrangement. "The right to procreate very simply is the
right to have natural children, whether through sexual
intercourse or artificial insemination. It is no more than
that." 3' The court suggested that Mr. Stern and Ms.
Whitehead had not been deprived of the right to procreate as defined, because Baby M is their child.3 ' It may
be true that these two people were not denied their constitutional right to procreate. However, the decision of
the court to ban, or even criminalize, commercial surrogacy will obstruct, or certainly chill, the procreative
rights of persons using this method of reproduction in
the future. Had the New Jersey Supreme Court come to
this decision previously, it is clear, Baby M would not
have been born.
The New Jersey court held that the payment of
money as part of a surrogacy agreement is contrary to
state law and policy. Commercial surrogacy is "illegal,
perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to
women." 3 1 In the following section Iexamine the ques-
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tion of whether the payment of money should change a
legal, possibly constitutionally protected, activity into
an unlawful, possibly criminal, enterprise.
The State Should Not Permit the Payment of
Money in Return for a Binding Waiver of
Parental Rights
If parties have a privacy right to enter into surrogacy
arrangements, should there be any bar to the exchange
of money? I will argue that payments that are made
expressly on condition that the gestational mother agree
to a binding termination of her parental rights are tantamount to the purchase of a baby and should be prohibited. However, the state should not ban payments to
the woman for the conception, gestation, and birth of
the child.
Legal and ethical objections to surrogacy often turn
on the payment of money to the gestational mother and
to a third-party broker. The British, as their media vividly expressed, were revolted by the idea of paying a
price for a human being. The Surrogacy Arrangements
Act 1985, which was hastily enacted before the Warnock Committee" presented its report to the government, prevents third parties (i.e., brokers) from deriving
financial benefits.34 The act does not expressly ban payments to the gestational mother.
The most articulate voice in the United States for
banning commercial surrogacy has been the New Jersey
Supreme Court. In the Baby M decision it stated:
This is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the
sale of a mother's right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the purchasers is
the father. Almost every evil that prompted the
prohibition of payment of money in connection
with adoptions exists here.' 5
Treating a child as a commodity is unconstitutional and
contrary to public policy. The Thirteenth Amendment
to the Constitution prohibits involuntary servitude, or
the buying and selling of human beings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, held that certain payments by adoptive parents that appeared to be for the
child were unconstitutional. The state constitution declared that all people are born with inalienable
6 rights,
including the right not to be bought or sold.'
State statutes make it a criminal offense to pay to
adopt a child. Surrogacy contracts are markedly similar
to paid adoption. In both cases the payment is for delivery of a baby: there is no substantive difference between paying a woman to gestate a child and then to
deliver it, and paying a woman to deliver an already
"produced" child. Both use a brokerage mechanisman adoption agency or a surrogacy broker.' 7 It was on
the basis of the state adoption statute that the Supreme

Court of New Jersey found the Baby M contract to be
unlawful. The court saw the same conflict with public
policy as exists in private adoptions for money. There is
the "inducement of money," the "coercion of contract,"
and the "total disregard of the best interests of the
child."' 8
A Gestational Mother Has the Right to Be
Paid for Her Services
If paying for the termination of parental rights is wrong,
is it also wrong to compensate the gestational mother
for her services in being artificially inseminated and carrying the fetus to term? I argue, firstly, that banning
payment for gestational services would deprive the
woman of the right to be paid for valued labor. Secondly, it is important to get beyond the term "babyselling." Rather, we should ask what harms would accrue from paying a woman for gestational services, and
how those harms can be minimized. Finally, a flat prohibition on the payment of money would chill the practice of surrogacy so thoroughly as to be a de facto ban.
This would deprive the parties of their reproductive
rights as surely as a prohibition on payment for other
reproductive services such as contraception or abortion.
A human being has a right to contract with another
to be paid for the performance of services, even highly
personal services. The "women's work" of conception,
gestation, and birth is arduous, and has a high social
worth. For the state to prohibit payment for such work
would deprive women of compensation for valued labor. They are entitled to economic gain for the physical
changes in their bodies, the changes in lifestyle, the work
of carrying a fetus, and the pain and medical risk of
labor and parturition. Critics of surrogacy assert that it
enslaves the woman. But performing personal services
and labor in exchange for money is not equivalent to
slavery. There is no slave-master relationship, no involuntary peonage, and no entitlement to control any human being.
Some advocates claim that paying women to provide
reproductive services exploits poor or uneducated
women, who are "coerced" by the marketplace into selling their intimate personal services.' 9 As the Baby M
court put it: the "essential evil is... taking advantage of
a woman's circumstances. " 4" This is analogous to prostitution, which is a criminal offense.
A woman's decision to sell her intimate services may
well constitute an indignity for all women and may well
mean that she is allowing herself to be exploited. Nonetheless, that choice is not for the state or the body politic
but for the woman alone to make. As the American Civil
Liberties Union policy on prostitution states, "whether a
person chooses to engage in sexual activity for purposes
of recreation, or in exchange for something of value, is
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a matter of individual choice, not for governmental
interference." 4 ' A woman has a privacy right to determine how she will use her own body, and whether or
not she will seek compensation. The state may not approve of the decision she makes, but it has no right to
override it. It is particularly paternalistic to assume that
the state can dictate a woman's choice because it knows
better than she what is in her interests as a human being.
The Baby M court states that the "evils inherent
in baby bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons."'4 ' However, examination of those reasons shows
they are neither loathsome nor uncorrectable-and that
they are not caused by money changing hands. It is important to get beyond the charged term "baby-selling"
to examine what harm would accrue to the child, the
parties, or society.
I have already referred to the lack of any demonstrable evidence that the baby in a surrogacy arrangement is
harmed by any objective measure. There is no indication
that the potential harm is any greater than the risk we
already tolerate in other births. We do not, for example,
restrict the reproductive freedoms of unwed mothers or
"conventional" families with a history of child neglect,
drug or alcohol abuse, or congenital disease such as
AIDS.
Most commentators concede that there is not
enough evidence of potential harm to the children to
justify banning commercial surrogacy. Rather, they argue that the commercialization of reproduction degrades humankind. 43 All personal attributes (e.g., sex,
race, height, eye color, intelligence) would be given a
dollar value. This is also a speculative argument, since it
does not rely on any tangible injury to the parties or to
society. The "commodification" argument assumes that
it is morally wrong to pay money for reproductive services. It is not for government to judge the morality of
payment by a genetic father and his partner, particularly
when it is the only way a couple can reproduce. Further,
parents in a surrogacy arrangement want children for
reasons probably no less humane or understandable
than those of parents who reproduce by conventional
means. Conventional parents, like surrogate parents,
have children for many reasons, some for love, some for
money, and some because they have a certain image of
the offspring they would like to have. There is no
"ideal" reason for choosing a mate and having a baby.
Finally, there is no evidence for the "slippery slope"
argument that commercial surrogacy will lead to market
values being placed on particular genetic traits. As conceived here, surrogacy would be carefully regulated and
non-enforceable by the courts-hardly a strong encouragement to a free marketplace for babies.
The remaining reasons given by the Baby M court
for banning commercial surrogacy are eminently correctable. The court was concerned that there is "no

counseling, independent or otherwise, of the natural
mother, no evaluation, no warning" 44 and that the genetic father knows "little about the natural mother, her
genetic makeup, and her psychological and medical
history."4 5 The same can be said of any private adoption. The legislature has ample regulatory power to require counseling, as well as social, medical, and psychological reports. The law, then, can require all that is
necessary to ensure full information and the fitness of
the parties to enter into the surrogacy arrangement.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's other criticisms of
surrogacy can also be rectified by adherence to the civil
liberties principles set out in this essay. The court was
concerned that the gestational mother is irrevocably
committed "before she knows the strength of her bond
with her child."4 6 The court's ruling that the gestational
mother's contractual waiver is void means that she is
free to change her mind and to contest custody under a
"best interests" standard. The parties to a surrogacy
agreement as envisaged here are in much the same position as unwed parents who have a custody dispute.
The evils of surrogacy do not arise because of the exchange of money, but because of the contract's irrevocable waiver. Voiding that contractual provision would
eradicate much of the social concern over surrogacy.
The final argument against banning the payment of
money is that it would thoroughly chill the practice of
surrogacy. A ban on payment will virtually ensure that
the would-be parents' individual and collective reproductive rights are never expressed. Payment for services
in our society has become so essential that prohibiting
compensation would virtually ban the practice. "All
parties concede that it is unlikely that surrogacy will
survive without money."14 7 One need only contemplate
the prospect of banning payment for other reproductive
services, such as contraception or abortion, to understand the barrier it would pose to continuation of surrogacy arrangements.
The Difference Between Paying for Gestational
Services and for the Termination of
Parental Rights
I have drawn a civil liberties distinction between payment for a binding agreement to terminate parental
rights and for gestational services. The distinction is
supported by the analysis in the following section, stating why a woman should not be bound by an agreement
to terminate her parental rights. If the distinction is accepted, it provides guidance on how surrogacy arrangements can be structured so as not to involve the purchase of a child.
Surrogacy contracts are equivalent to "baby-selling"
if they essentially offer payment for the delivery of an
uncluttered title to the child. The state could block this

Volume j6:

i-z,

approach by proscribing payment of any fee contingent
upon termination of the woman's parental rights, while
allowing periodic payments throughout the pregnancy
to compensate the woman for her services and health
care expenses.

It will be argued that structuring a contract as payment for services rather than for delivery of the child is
a "nice" legal distinction, but that this nonetheless remains merely a pretense for baby-selling. After all, when
a person pays for labor, he or she is really paying for the
commodity that the labor produces. The genetic father
is not interested in the gestational mother's childbearing experiences. He wants, and believes he is paying
for, her baby. The New Jersey Supreme Court had
no doubt whatsoever that the money is being paid
to obtain an adoption and not ... for the personal

services of Mary Beth Whitehead. ... It strains
credulity to claim that these arrangements, touted
by those in the surrogacy business as an attractive
alternative to the usual route leading to an adoption, really amount to something other than a private placement adoption for money.48
That is true when a gestational mother can be compelled
by contract to give up her baby. It is not true, however,

where she is entitled to maintain her parental rights. The
issue is not what a contracting father wants or what a
private broker promises, but what the law will allow. If
the law does not allow payment in exchange for the
child, and if the courts will not enforce any contractual
provision in which the woman waives her parental
rights, then the distinction between payment for the
baby and payment for gestational services is real, and
not a pretense. The surrogacy contract would provide
no entitlement to the child.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Surrogate Parenting v. Com. Ex Rel. Armstrong,4 9 considered
whether a valid constitutional distinction could be
drawn between payment for gestational services and
payment for the child. The court held that payments to
the woman under a surrogacy contract were for her
services, not the baby. The woman could not be forced
by the contract to forgo her parental rights; therefore,
there was no selling of the baby. This decision is consistent with the civil liberties arguments presented here,
except for the manner in which payment was actually
made:
[A] portion of the fee is paid in advance for the
use of her body as an incubator, but a portion of
the payment is withheld and is not paid until her
child is delivered unto the purchaser, along with
the equivalent of a bill of sale, or quit claim deed,
to wit-.the judgment terminating her parental
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rights. How can it be denied that this last payment
is in fact payment for the baby?5 0
A civil liberties theory of surrogacy would avoid this
inconsistency by prohibiting payments under a contract
in exchange for the waiver of the parental rights of the
gestational mother.
A Gestational Mother Cannot Waive Her
Rights to Determine Her Own Lifestyle, to
Have an Abortion, or to Parent Her Child
One simple way to determine parental rights over the
child born of a surrogacy agreement is to grant them to
the father. After all, the gestational mother signed a
contract in which she probably made a series of promises about her lifestyle, medical treatment, and, most
importantly, parental rights over the child. 5 ' Many surrogacy contracts provide for specific performance of
these promises. 5' Why shouldn't the gestational mother
be compelled in a court of law to fulfill her contractual
obligations?-5
The legal question of whether a person can waiveM
privacy and parental rights are unsettled. There is a
strong presumption against waiver of constitutional or
fundamental rights. 55 A person cannot waive constitutional rights unless she does so knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently, "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 's6 This
"voluntariness and knowledge" standard might be applied in individual cases to show that the gestational
mother did or did not make a fully informed choice
when she signed the contract.
There are some rights, however, that cannot be irrevocdbly waived-that is, the person can change her
mind even after she has agreed to waive her rights.5' For
example, criminal defendants cannot irrevocably waive
the right to be present at trial in a capital case, 58 to raise
a plea of incompetence to stand trial, 59 or to assert a
privilege against self-incrimination.6
Advance waiver of a constitutional right is particularly troublesome, because the person cannot foresee all
the circumstances that will affect a future decision.
Therefore, some rights can be waived only at the time
they could be invoked. A federal Court of Appeal refused for this reason to recognize a woman's waiver of
her due-process rights when signing a foster-care contract, because the relationship the foster parent sought
to protect
did not exist at the time she signed the
6
contract. '

The courts, therefore, have been highly suspicious of
advance waivers of fundamental rights. However, there
has been no specific judicial guidance on whether the
courts would refuse, on constitutional grounds, to enforce the various promises that are often made in sur-
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rogacy contracts," I will argue that to hold a woman to
a promise to waive her human rights sometime in the
future diminishes her constitutionl entitlements. I am
not suggesting, however, that a gestational mother cannot waive the exercise of her rights at the time they have
to be invoked. She can choose not to avail herself of her
right to an abortion or to conduct her life the way she
pleases. A gestational mother can also decide not to
assert her parental rights when the child is born or,
preferably, after a period of time following the birth.
This is analogous to state adoption statutes that allow a
woman who has agreed to relinquish her parental rights
over her baby to change her mind any time before the
baby is born. In most states the mother has a grace
period after birth in which she can still decide to keep
the child.
The rights of a gestational mother to make future
decisions about her body, lifestyle, and an intimate future relationship with her child are so important to her
dignity and human happiness that they should be regarded as inalienable. First, consider the contractual
provisions that seek to deprive the gestational mother of
her right to make decisions about her medical treatment
and lifestyle: restricting or prohibiting smoking, use of
alcohol or drugs (prescription as well as recreational),
sex or other "strenuous" activity, and abortion; or requiring regular prenatal examination, amniocentesis,
and abortion if the baby is likely to be severely handicapped.
The rights to choose one's lifestyle and medical treatment are among the most private aspects of human life.
The government itself cannot restrict these activities unless it demonstrates that the person is incompetent or
that there is some compelling health purpose. s No such
health purpose exists in surrogacy, particularly where
these activities take place in private and do not affect the
public. Since the government cannot reach into this intensely private domain, it is difficult to envisage a private party having the power to do so based upon a
contractual obligation.
The genetic father will point to the potential harm to
the fetus as the rationale for intervention. This makes
the mother and fetus into adversaries, locked in a con4
flict over whose health and well-being will prevail.
While courts recently have been prepared to intervene in
cases of immediate and substantial threat to the fetus
(e.g., to require a Cesarean delivery),6 5 the government
does not have a general right to control how a pregnant
woman lives her life or the medical treatment she
chooses. It would be unconscionable if pregnant women
could have private decisions forced on them in ways that
Would be wholly unimaginable for others. Pregnancy,
although it entails another life to consider, should not
become a license for denying women their basic right to
be left alone to make the health decisions they choose.

Neither government nor a private party has the right
to dictate deeply personal choices to the gestational
mother, even if they have extracted a promise in exchange for money. Just as important is the deep invasion
of privacy involved in monitoring and possibly enforcing the gestational mother's compliance with her promises. There is no lawful and ethical way to determine
how a gestational mother is behaving within her own
home. Various monitoring and enforcement methods
themselves pose threats to individual privacy and autonomy-e.g., testing blood for alcohol or drug use. And to
compel submission to a medical procedure such as a
gynecological examination, amniocentesis, or abortion
is tantamount to a battery-an unconscionable violation of the woman's bodily integrity.6
There has not been much caselaw in these areas.
However, an analysis of the Supreme Court's abortion
decisions indicates that choices affecting privacy and autonomy are for the woman alone to make. In Planned
Parenthoodv. Danforth 7 the Supreme Court held that
a husband does not have the right to veto his wife's
decision to seek an abortion. "Since the State cannot
regulate or proscribe abortion ... the State cannot del-

egate authority to any particular person, even the
spouse, to prevent abortion." 68 In Belotti v.Baird6 the
Supreme Court also invalidated a state statute that required a woman to get her parents' consent to an
abortion. 70 As neither husbands nor parents can overrule a woman's decision to get an abortion, the courts
would be highly unlikely to give
this right to the father
7
in a surrogacy arrangement. '
The second major right that surrogacy contracts seek
to deny the gestational mother is her choice to assert
parental claims over her child. Natural parents have parental rights over their children unless there is a judicial
finding that their behavior is seriously detrimental to the
child's interests. Decisions about parenthood, like treatment and lifestyle decisions, are essential to dignity and
future happiness. These rights may seem abstract and
unimportant before they need to be invoked. The gestational mother signs the contract because, at the time,
she may have no interest in having a baby herself and
she sees the arrangement as offering financial compensation for work performed. 72 Yet once the gestational
mother is faced with the actual decision, her rights become of utmost importance. Understandably, the gestational mother's feelings may change once she has nurtured the fetus, given birth to a human being whom she
recognizes as part of herself and then holds, cares for,
and comes to love. Any parent who has experienced
birth and the discovery of the infant's unique human
qualities and character cannot help but appreciate the
possibility of such changes in feelings, judgment, and
outlook.
Irreversible decisions about child-rearing, then,
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ought not to be forced on any mother nine months before her rights have any real meaning. The decision to
give up one's own child for a lifetime is an awesome
responsibility to place on any human being.
Proponents of surrogacy repeatedly assert that to
hold these personal rights inalienable is indefensibly paternalistic, and disparaging of the decision-making capacity of women. 73 To hold the parental right inalienable, they suggest, is to degrade women by implying
they need to be protected from their "irrational" or
"whimsical" impulses, and that they cannot understand
the import of relinquishing a child.
These arguments show an almost willful blindness to
the true meaning of paternalism and to the reasons why
fundamental rights should be inalienable. It is paternalistic to make a decision for another person because you
believe you know better than she what is in her true
interests. To hold the parental right inalienable is not
paternalistic at all. Rather, it respects the woman's final
decision regarding her bodily integrity and future associations. The principle of inalienability indicates that the
woman controls her own destiny and cannot be prevented by contract from making the decision herself
when it becomes important.
This argument is not gender-based. There are certain
things that we can contract about-property, goods,
and services. But there are other things so important to
human flourishing and self-respect that they should not
be specifically enforceable by contract, whether the subject is male or female. We do not call patients "ficklei"
for example, if they decide to withdraw their previously
given consent to a medical procedure. It is insulting to
suggest that because the law allows gestational mothers
to withdraw consent to a waiver of parental rights, the
women are indecisive or need protection.
Determining Custody Within a Civil
Liberties Framework
When a child is born of a surrogacy arrangement, the
woman who gave birth to the child is the legal mother
unless she relinquishes her parental status through
adoption. The man who entered into the agreement and
who donated his sperm is the legal father. Termination
of the parental rights of the gestational mother or the
genetic father can be judicially determined only under
statutory criteria in each state. Most states will not terminate parental rights unless it is demonstrated that the
parent is unfit; a mere showing that it would not be in
the child's best interests to live with a parent is insufficient to terminate the parent's wider parental rights,
4
including visitation.7
The two genetic parents in a surrogacy arrangement
may each want custody of the child. If one of them

declines to waive a claim to the child and a dispute
ensues, who should have custody? And by what standard should the question be determined?
Custody determinations are potentially so harmful
to the child that many believe the law should intervene
with a clear rule favoring the genetic father or the gestational mother. 75 Undoubtedly, custody battles should
be avoided wherever possible because of the potential
trauma to the child. But a judicial determination becomes necessary when each parent seeks custody over
the child, and it is not obvious in every case which placement would be in the child's best interests. The adoption
of an automatic rule foreclosing the parental rights of
the man or the woman would be iniquitous. First,
"bright line" rules deter deeper inquiry into the best
interests of the child in each case. Using sex as a proxy
for a thoroughgoing assessment of the child's interests
would not serve those interests well. Second, the parental interests of either the father or the mother would not
be respected. Natural parents have substantive and procedural due process rights to assert a claim to custody
before a court. 6 A "clear rule" would determine which
parent could exercise the fundamental right of association with one's children by presumption, rather than by
individual findings of fact. Third, a "clear rule"
amounts to a rigid form of discrimination based upon
gender. Whether a court uses the contract to favor the
father or sees the woman's unique reproductive capabilities as a reason to favor the mother, 7 ' it is really
using the parents' sex, rather than a best-interests standard, to determine custody. This would permit custody
to be based on status criteria traditionally used to discriminate against individuals.
These reasons against a clear rule are all based upon
strong civil liberties principles, which should not be
abridged except for compelling reasons. Both sides in
the surrogacy debate argue that there are compelling
reasons for a dear rule in their favor. I have already
shown why there should not be a paternal presumption
based upon the surrogacy contract. Nor should economic status be the sole determining factor for assessing
a child's best interests. Economic status usually favors
the father-particularly in a surrogacy arrangement,
which virtually guarantees a marked disparity in the
wealth of the mother and the father. Material advantage
is not an important measure for the best interests of the
child, and has a discriminatory effect on women. The
"best interests" test is designed to help the child become
a "well integrated person who might reasonably be expected to be happy with life.' T8 The court should not be
concerned with the kind of "idealized life that money
79
can buy. "
Advocates of the rights of the gestational mother say
she has contributed most to the surrogacy arrangement.
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Her nine months of gestation not only make her deserving of the child but also put her in a much better position to form a bond and to care for the childY8' It is
argued, moreover, that the present law on parentage
already provides a clear preference for the gestational
mother. A woman who gives birth to a child is held
legally responsible for its welfare, whereas sperm donors
cannot assert a parental claim over any child born by
use of their sperm.
The comparison between a genetic father who simply donates sperm and one who enters into a surrogacy
agreement is inapt, however. Once a donor gives his
sperm to a bank in return for a fee he has completed his
"transaction"; he has no intention to reproduce and has
not committed himself to, or prepared for, the responsibilities of parenthood. Moreover, once the man has
donated his sperm he knows nothing further of its use.
In short, he has not acted like a father and has no
ground for asserting the rights of a father. By contrast,
a genetic father in a surrogacy arrangement initiates the
whole procreative process. His psychological, emotional, and financial investment in planning the birth,
care, and nurturance of the child may be considerable.
He acts like a father in the sense that he has an intent to
procreate and desires a relationship with the child.
The Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois"' held that
an unwed father is entitled to notice and a hearing before a court determines that he has no right to custody
of his child. Subsequent cases, involving foreclosure of
parental rights through adoption rather than denial of
custody, s do limit the principle enunciated in Stanley.
Those cases suggest that a father acquires due process
rights only when he "act[s] as a father toward his
children." 8 3Thus, an unwed father who visited and supported his child only irregularly had no constitutional
right to a hearing. s Conversely, where the father established a relationship by living with, caring for, and8 5supporting the child, he did have due process rights.
Most troubling about the Stanley line of cases is that
the Court appears to be concerned with the custodial,
personal, and financial relationship the father actually
established. The father's intent and good-faith efforts to
establish a relationship with his child are insufficient. In
Lebr v. Robertson,' the putative father had taken every
opportunity to establish a relationship with his child. He
lived with the mother for two years until the birth and
visited the child in the hospital every day; he never
ceased in his efforts to locate the child after the mother
concealed her; and he offered financial support. The
Court, nonetheless, held that he had no right to a hearing before termination of his parental rights.
In a surrogacy arrangement the genetic father ought
not to be foreclosed from a hearing on the best interests
of the child. He had the paternal intention to procreate,

and he may have done all that he could to prepare for
the child and to seek a relationship with her. We should
not automatically assume that it is always in the best
interests of the child to remain with the mother.
Civil liberties principles, therefore, require that such
factors as sex and economic status should not become
proxies for assessing an individual child's best interests.
Neither factor is a good predictor of the ability to parent
well-although both should be considered, to the extent
strictly relevant to the child's best interests.
Custody should also be determined without regard
to the existence of the surrogacy agreement. The fact
that the mother entered into a surrogacy agreement
should not be held against her in determining custody;
she has not neglected, abandoned, or adversely affected
her child in any way. A woman is no less able to parent
her child because she originally decided to surrender her
legitimate claim as its true mother. This conclusion is
consistent with the civil liberties approach taken here
that contractual provisions requiring an irrevocable
waiver of parental rights should be void. To use a surrogacy agreement against the gestational mother in a
custody dispute would inhibit the exercise of her constitutional right to associate with her child.
Conclusion
The approach to custody taken in this essay is simple
and consistent with current law and practice. If the surrogacy arrangement goes as planned, as so many have in
the past, then the child will grow up with parents probably as stable and secure as the parents of any conventionally born child. I also treat surrogacy arrangements
that break down in the same way as the law treats marriages that break down or births out of wedlock. None
of these cases of parents tugging at their child for custody are happy ones. Yet none create insurmountable
obstacles to the future well-being of the child. So long as
the law treats the child as a person wanted by both
parents and sensitively allocates parental rights and responsibilities, including custody, there is every reason to
believe that the child can, and will, flourish.
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